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INTRODUCTION

Professor Lynn Baker's contribution to this symposium' extends her longterm project both to defend and to critique the Supreme Court's decisions on
the scope of congressional power. 2 I find this work valuable and not a little
provocative. If Baker's account of the decisions thus far is even partly right,
the Court is poised to assume decision-making responsibility that has long
been ceded to Congress. If her proposals for the future are adopted, we are in
for a cataclysmic constitutional event that rivals the convulsive period when
the nation confronted the judicial arrogation of authority associated (rightly or
3
wrongly) with the decision we're here to remember: Lochner v. New York.

Concomitantly, we are faced with the same methodological masks the Lochner
Court wore to conceal what it was actually about. With a few notable
exceptions, the modem Court has revealed no inclination routinely to
superintend state regulatory policy. 4 Yet Professor Baker contends that the

* Professor of Law, Boston University. I would like to thank Winston Bowman and
William Kaleva for help with this commentary.
I Lynn A. Baker, Lochner's Legacy for Modern Federalism:Pierce County v. Guillen as
a Case Study, 85 B.U. L. REV. 727 (2005) [hereinafter Baker, Lochner's Legacy].
2 E.g., Lynn A. Baker, Conditional Federal Spending After Lopez, 95 COLUM. L. REV.
1911 (1995) [hereinafter Baker, ConditionalFederalSpending]; Lynn A. Baker & Mitchell
N. Berman, Getting Off the Dole: Why the Court Should Abandon Its Spending Doctrine,
and How a Too-Clever Congress Could Provoke It to Do So, 78 IND. L.J. 459 (2003); Lynn
A. Baker, The Spending Power and the Federalist Revival, 4 CHAP. L. REv. 195 (2001)
[hereinafter Baker, The Spending Power].
3 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
4 The obvious examples are Takings Clause cases. Just recently, the Court granted
review in Kelo v. City of New London Connecticut, ostensibly to consider whether to
second-guess state officials' determination that a condemnation of property was for a
"public use." 843 A.2d 500 (Conn. 2004), cert. granted, 73 U.S.L.W. 3204 (U.S. Sept. 28,
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Court does (and should) presume to rein in Congress' ability to pursue similar
goals. The theme on the surface is federalism. The implication is a
fundamental shift in the locus of decision-making power from the legislative to
the judicial branch.
I want first to situate Professor Baker's work within a larger scholarly
literature. Next, I will examine Baker's analysis in this particular piece, in
which she critiques Justice Thomas' opinion for a unanimous Court in Pierce
v. County of Guillen,5 sustaining § 409 of the Highway Safety Act under the
Commerce Clause. 6 I will take quick looks at the spending power analysis
Professor Baker would have preferred in Guillen and the explanation she
supplies for the route the Court actually took. Finally, I will offer an
alternative account that (I think) is more in keeping with the ambient case law.
I.

THE LANDSCAPE

Professor Baker's work fits within two streams of literature tracking
American political developments. In the main, she joins a choir of academic
voices praising the limits the Rehnquist Court has placed on Congress'
authority to regulate commerce, to dragoon state authorities into implementing
federal policies, and to subject the states to private suits for damages. 7 The
methodology of choice under this banner is characteristically textualist,
originalist, and formalist.
Constitutional meaning is understood to be
determinate, its pursuit an exercise in discovery rather than invention. 8 The
1789 document and its amendments are said to fix a goodly range of ideas in

constitutional stone. In this instance, the text itself, informed by history, marks
off congressional power in formal categories from which Congress cannot
stray. If it follows that Congress is unable to enact national social welfare,
civil rights, and environmental legislation, we must grin and bear it. Like
2004) (No. 04-108). Cases in which the Court enforces structural constitutional limits on
state authority to regulate commerce may also be illustrations. There, too, the Court
presumes to re-examine the wisdom of state regulatory policy. See, e.g., Philadelphia v.
New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 628 (1978). Recall, though, that the justices are far from united
in these endeavors. Justice Scalia objects to current doctrine in so-called "dormant"
Commerce Clause cases in part because it presses judges to weigh policies better suited for
judgment by politically accountable officials. See, e.g., CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of
Am., 481 U.S. 69, 95 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring). Moreover, with an eye on matters
considered below, I should note that the Chief Justice doubts the Court's capacity (in the
dormant Commerce Clause context) to distinguish between traditional governmental
functions and proprietary activities in the market. See, e.g., South-Central Timber Dev. v.
Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82, 101-02 (1984) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
5 537 U.S. 129 (2003).
6 23 U.S.C. § 409 (2000).
7 See, e.g., John 0. McGinnis, Reviving Tocqueville's America: The Rehnquist Court's
Jurisprudenceof Social Discovery, 90 CAL. L. REV. 485, 511-12, 521 (2002).
8 KEITH

E.

WHITTINGTON,

CONSTITUTIONAL

ORIGINAL INTENT, AND JUDICIAL REVIEW

6 (1999).

INTERPRETATION:

TEXTUAL

MEANING,
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others in this camp, Baker faults the Court's decisions curbing congressional
authority only insofar as they allow Congress more regulatory room than the
Framers of our Constitution intended. 9 The point of her work is to urge the
Court to be more "consistent." 10 Specifically, she contends that the "Federalist
Revival" will come to naught if the Court leaves the states "at the mercy" of
Congress' ability to achieve regulatory goals by placing conditions on federal
spending. I'
Baker's work also fits (roughly) within a more pragmatic tradition, which
has it that the Constitution should be interpreted to fortify the democratic
process. 12 She insists that her approach to congressional authority does not rise
or fall on originalism in general or on her understanding of "the Framers'
intent" in particular. 13 In her view, "both formalists and functionalists" should
favor "the restoration of limits on Congress's spending power," because it
would increase "aggregate social welfare."' 14 As Baker sees it, the structure of
the Federal Government, particularly the apportionment of the Senate, favors
less populous states. Those states, in turn, exploit Congress' spending power
to channel federal resources their way. Moreover, Congress' ability to attach
strings to federal funds generates conditions that effectively coerce states into
adopting policies they would otherwise disclaim.' 5
I confess it. I don't understand the academic obsession with textualism,
originalism, and the formalist reasoning they so often entail. There is a
familiar literature refuting the notion that constitutional meaning can be16
derived from the text alone or in company with other surviving documents.
Truth is, the arguments for textualism and originalism have been demolished.
Were it not for the Supreme Court's stubborn refusal to give them up, there
would be no fish left in those barrels worth the shooting.' 7 Nor do I
understand how the Court's apologists conceive that textualism and
9 Baker, Lochner's Legacy, supra note 1, at 751-52.

'0 Id. at 734-39.
" Id. at 734.
12 See, e.g., JOHN H. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST

(1980); cf Steven G. Calabresi,

Textualism and the CountermajoritarianDifficulty, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1373, 1385-

1389 (1998) (defending decisions promoting federalism on the ground that they prevent the
Federal Government from imposing social policies that southern and western states find
undesirable).
13 Baker, The Spending Power,supra note 2, at 198.
14 Id. at 218.
15 Id. at 214-16.
16 See, e.g., RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., IMPLEMENTING THE CONSTITUTION 13-25 (2001)

(providing a good summary and citing some of the best authorities).
17 Still, the Court does insist on citing the text, together with its history, as justification
for constitutional decisions. That style of opinion writing (and I do think references to the
text and its history are largely a matter of style) encourages academics to try again (and
again and again) to refurbish textualism and originalism into something serviceable. I find

those efforts manifestly unsuccessful.
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originalism can explain and justify decisions curtailing congressional authority.
The Court's own attempts to justify those decisions on textualist and originalist
grounds are feeble at best. 18 Sadly, the justices are bereft of any convincing
explanation for their judgments and apparently hope the public will be
mollified if they turn palms up and stammer that James Madison made them do
it. Academic textualists and originalists typically concede that they can't
explain the lion's share of settled constitutional law in the United States. 19
Certainly, it is unpersuasive to argue that the 1789 document in historical
context establishes the idea of federalism in any form that lends itself to
judicial enforcement. 20 Frankly, I'm not sure that anything important rides on
the existence of the odd-shaped political units we call states, far less on a
structural inference of no discernible shape at all. 21 The "framers" were
obliged to take the states as given; they had no other choice. 22 American
federalism is the product of a time when it was not yet clear that ours would be
a single nation. 23 No one writing on a clean slate would create these states and
give them any serious juridical consequence as separate entities in the
overarching governmental structure. We might have done away with the states
altogether were it not that political office-holders, national and local, draw
their authority from them. 24 We have the states we do by historical accident;
we perpetuate them by political impasse. In any case, there is no convincing

18

In Printz v. United States, 521 U.S 898, 905 (1997), Justice Scalia admitted that he had

no text at all with which to work. In Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 713 (1999), Justice

Kennedy disclaimed reliance on the text of the Eleventh Amendment and rested
alternatively on hotly contested inferences from the Constitution and original understanding.
Regarding the latter, he offered nothing to prove that the "framers" meant to immunize the
states from suit in their own courts. He argued, instead, that state sovereign immunity was
so solidly established that there was no occasion even to mention it. Id. at 724. That was
not to summon historical evidence for a controversial modem decision, but rather to
manufacture the decision from the absence of historical evidence.
19 E.g. Henry Paul Monaghan, Stare Decisis and ConstitutionalAdjudication, 88 COLUM.
L. REV. 723, 723-24 (1988).
20 See Frank B. Cross, The Folly of Federalism, 24 CARDOZO L. REV. 1, 1-2 (2002);
Larry D. Kramer, Putting the Politics Back into the PoliticalSafeguards of Federalism, 100
COLUM. L. REV. 215, 235 (2000) [hereinafter Kramer, Political Safeguards]; Peter M.
Shane, Federalism's "Old Deal": What's Right and Wrong with Conservative Judicial
Activism, 45 VILL. L. REV. 201, 231 (2000).
21 See Larry Kramer, Understanding Federalism,47 VAND. L. REV. 1485, 1486 (1994)
(explaining that modem federalism is the product of unpredicted developments in American
politics and now enjoys no settled content).
22 Lewis B. Kaden, Politics, Money, and State Sovereignty: The Judicial Role, 79
COLUM. L. REV. 847, 849 (1979).
23 Edward L. Rubin & Malcolm Feeley, Federalism:Some Notes on a NationalNeurosis,
41 UCLA L. REV. 903, 908 (1994).
24 Cf Kramer, Political Safeguards,supra note 20, at 278 (explaining that the states now
rely for their protection on state and federal officials who depend on local political support).
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evidence that federalism ever had sufficient hard content to produce the
25
modem decisions in which Professor Baker is interested.
Nor is there any obvious pragmatic reason for conjuring up federalism as a
serious constitutional limit on the way we structure modem government.
Some academicians (and a few justices) contend not that federalism is valuable
in itself, but rather that the diffusion of governmental power by any means
ultimately safeguards individual liberty. 26 That's a rough and dissatisfying
view and not one Professor Baker shares. 27 We live in an age when powerful
political, economic, and environmental forces are pulling the world's people
closer together. The problems we face defy historically contingent political
boundaries. Regional and transnational arrangements are increasingly the
norm. 28 This is not to say that it is always preferable to govern outward from
the center, nor to argue that decentralization should always be limited to
administration. 29 Still, I do wonder whether it is wise to assume reflexively
that federalism (as distinct from decentralization) is all that it is cracked up to
be and thus to read a demonstrably inefficient version of it into our
30
foundational law.
Professor Baker's points about political accountability are not
The imperfections in American government are obvious
inconsiderable.
enough. Baker is correct that Congress may establish conditions for federal
funds that McGovern liberals like me abhor. 31 I must say, though, that limiting

25 H. Geoffrey Moulton, Jr.,

The Quixotic Search for a Judicially Enforceable

Federalism, 83 MINN. L. REV. 849, 852 (1999); Jeff Powell, The Compleat Jeffersonian:
Justice Rehnquist and Federalism, 91 YALE L.J. 1317, 1363-70 (1982).
26 E.g., Clarence Thomas, Why FederalismMatters, 48 DRAKE L. REv. 231, 234 (2000).
27 See Baker, The Spending Power, supra note 2, at 196 n.6 (explaining that she is not

only concerned about "protecting individuals" but also is worried about "protecting the
states against federal expenditures they find problematic").
28 Of course, this is also an age in which ethnic and religious forces constantly drive us
apart, invariably with painful results. I should have thought that recent experience with
political disintegration would give us pause when we turn to the relationship between the
Federal Government and the states.
29See generally Barry Friedman, Valuing Federalism, 82 MINN. L. REv. 317 (1997)
(explaining that a more rigorous understanding of the values associated with federalism
would help identify the occasions on which local decision-making is most sensible); Jerry
Frug, Decentering Decentralization, 60 U. CHI. L. REv. 253 (1993) (countering any
monolithic claim that centralization is ineluctable).
30 The better case for federalism as a device for protecting liberty has it that autonomous
states may compete among themselves for citizens by offering individuals ever better
intrastate regulatory deals. Seth Kreimer, Federalism and Freedom, ANNALS AM. ACAD.
POL. & Soc. Sci., March 2001, at 66; Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Does the New Federalism
Really Matter?, 32 IND. L. REv. 11, 21 (1998); see also David J. Barron, Commentary: A
Localist Critique of the New Federalism, 51 DuKE L.J. 377, 379-80 (2001) (explaining that

the Court's decisions do not generally serve local autonomy at all).
31See Candice Hoke, Illusion, Reality, and a Federalism-Based Constitutional
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Congress' regulatory power is a blunt instrument for contending with smallstate hegemony. Professor Baker's account demonstrates that the states as we
know them are very much the problem, not the key to its solution. 32 In any
event, the question here is whether her ideas about using the Constitution to
redress these grievances promises something better. I will pass on to where
her views about constitutional meaning take her in this new piece.
II.

THE COMMERCE POWER ANALYSIS

Justice Thomas' analysis in Guillen is easy enough to follow: Congress'
power under the Commerce Clause includes the authority to regulate the
channels and instrumentalities of commerce; highways and vehicles are,
respectively, "channels" and "instrumentalities;" the point of the Highway
Safety Act is to maintain roads for safe vehicular traffic; to that end, §152 of
the Act requires state officials to collect information about dangerous
conditions needing attention; to encourage states to meet their responsibilities,
§ 409 overrides any duty to disclose those records in response to discovery
33
motions in traffic accident lawsuits.

I should have thought that Professor Baker would be pleased with this. To
be sure, Justice Thomas sustained § 409. Yet he did so without invoking
Congress' commodious power to regulate activities that substantially affect
interstate markets. That is the authority that he and others have insisted
amounts to an effective federal police power.34 Instead, Thomas relied
exclusively on Congress' power to regulate the channels and instrumentalities
of commerce. Of course, this alternative theory equally lends itself to
expansive federal regulation. 35 In any case, the headline story in Guillen is
Thomas' success in persuading his colleagues to forgo the usual "affecting
commerce" rationale for congressional action.
Professor Baker is not pleased at all. She does not explain why in this
paper. But she did explain in the amicus brief that she and Mitchell Berman
filed in Guillen.36 In that brief, she dismissed any argument that § 409 might
be defended as a regulation of channels and instrumentalities and insisted that

Challenge, 9 STAN. L. & POL'Y REv. 116-17 (1998) (describing the punitive conditions
Congress has placed on state welfare programs in exchange for federal funding).
32 Professor Baker is willing to entertain the idea that constitutional amendments might
resolve at least some of the difficulties she identifies. She has in mind existing proposals to
shape congressional spending. Baker, The Spending Power, supra note 2, at 225. Wouldn't
it be more sensible (if even less likely) to reapportion the Senate or even reconfigure the
states?
" Pierce County v. Guillen, 537 U.S. 129, 146-47 (2003).
14 United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 584-85 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring).
35 See ROBERT F. NAGEL, THE IMPLOSION OF AMERICAN FEDERALISM 24 (2001).
36 Brief of Amici Curiae Law Professors Lynn A. Baker and Mitchell N. Berman in

Support of Respondents, Pierce County v. Guillen, 537 U.S. 129 (2003) (No. 01-1229),
availableat 2002 WL 1964091 [hereinafter Baker & Berman Brief).
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the "affecting commerce" rationale is the only basis of congressional power
that is "even potentially relevant. '37 She then argued that § 409 cannot be
sustained on the "affecting commerce" ground in part because it is not "clear"
that "all" civil litigation in state court is "'economic activity' that 'substantially
affects interstate commerce."' 38 Therein, she invoked the Court's formal
distinction in United States v. Lopez between regulatory targets that are
commercial in nature and those that are not. 39 If the Court were to treat all
civil suits in state court as commercial, according to Baker, the
commercial/non-commercial distinction would surrender any capacity to
40
differentiate between "'what is truly national and what is truly local.'
Trouble is, the commercial/non-commercial distinction can't hope to do that
in any case. Justice Breyer rightly made fun of it in Lopez,41 and academics
have done the same ever since. 42 You know the drill: possessing a gun near a
school is not commercial behavior, 43 declining to purchase wheat at the market
is commercial, an and it's anybody's guess where nicking a purse at Park Street
Station falls. 45 It won't do to insist that federal and state authority can sensibly
be orchestrated simply by segregating regulated activities in two boxes, one for
economic affairs and the other for everything else. 46 The Chicago faculty must
be blushing en masse. This is the very formalism we associate with Lochner
and rightly condemn - a refusal to acknowledge that the occasion calls for
serious policy judgment and an attempt to hide the value choices that are
47
actually being made behind the fagade of labels.
Even if we take the commercial/non-commercial distinction seriously, its
administration is more complicated than either the Court or Professor Baker
lets on. First, the immediate target of the regulation must be identified;
second, that target must be characterized. At both stages, the Court faces the
omnipresent challenge to focus at the right level of generality. Professor Baker
17

Id. at 22-23.

38 Id. at

24 (quotingLopez, 514 U.S. at 560).
39 Lopez, 514 U.S. at 566.
40 Baker & Berman Brief, supra note 36, at 24 (quoting Lopez, 514 U.S. at 567-68).
4t 514 U.S. at 627-30 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
42 E.g., Michael C. Dorf, The Good Society, Commerce, and the Rehnquist Court, 69
FORDHAM L. REV. 2161, 2173-76 (2001); NAGEL, supra note 35, at 19.
43 Lopez, 514 U.S. at 560.
4 Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 127-28 (1942).
41 Even Professor McGinnis acknowledges that the commercial/non-commercial
distinction, if rigidly applied, threatens regulation that needs to be imposed at the national
level. McGinnis, supra note 7, at 518 (giving environmental controls as an obvious
illustration).
46 See Lawrence Lessig, TranslatingFederalism: United States v. Lopez, 1995 Su'. CT.
REV. 125, 176 (1995); Robert A. Schapiro & William W. Buzbee, Unidimensional
Federalism: Power and Perspective in Commerce Clause Adjudication, 88 CORNELL L.
REV. 1199, 1202 (2003).
47 See Frederick Schauer, Formalism, 97 YALE L.J. 509, 511-12 (1997).
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identifies § 409's target as the conduct of "all civil litigation in state court
involving causes of action brought solely under state law."'48 I might have
focused higher up the scale of generality and identified the target as the
prevention of wrecks on interstate highways. Baker herself concedes that
§ 409 might be understood that way. 49 Or I might have focused lower down on
the scale and identified the target as the discoverability of information in the
hands of officials hoping to avoid drawing checks on the local treasury.
Professor Baker characterizes the conduct of civil trials as non-economic (at
least in some of the cases affected). Frankly, civil litigation sounds pretty
commercial to me. If it's not, then my alternatives are: preventing highway
disasters (with all their attendant costs) and insulating information from
discovery in civil suits (potentially implicating expenditures of some order). In
all fairness, though, Professor Baker's article does not simply rehearse the
argument in her amicus brief, but rather addresses the analysis on which
Justice Thomas actually relied. Let's look at what she says.
Initially, Baker insists that Justice Thomas committed a threshold category
mistake. He treated § 409 as a regulation of the channels or instrumentalities
of commerce when, in truth, it is a regulation of the way in which state civil
trials are conducted.50 This is not the commercial/non-commercial distinction
itself, but it is a close cousin. Professor Baker presumes to know what counts
as a channel or instrumentality and what doesn't. She engages in the same
kind of formalist categorization we just went through and, concomitantly,
invites the same kind of criticism. There is something else, too. For Baker, it
is crucial to distinguish between the purpose of a federal regulatory scheme, on
the one hand, and the nature of a target activity, on the other.5' She concedes
that the overarching purpose of the Highway Safety Act is to improve highway
safety. She contends, however, that § 409 is aimed at a categorically different
activity (the conduct of civil actions in state court) and, accordingly, falls
outside Congress' regulatory reach. 52 This argument suffers from two shortcomings.
The first is not of Professor Baker's creation, but arises from the baseline
approach to congressional power Justice Thomas deployed in Guillen.53 The
working idea is that the power to regulate commerce includes the power to
determine the uses to which channels and instrumentalities are put. It doesn't
matter what activities a statute addresses immediately. Nor does it matter why
Congress chooses to regulate as it does. The Commerce Clause is satisfied so
long as Congress is careful to package what it does as a condition on, or a
48 Baker & Berman Brief, supra note 36, at 24.
49 Baker, Lochner's Legacy, supra note 1, at 737-38.

"OAt least, Baker argues, it's not so easy as Thomas suggests to categorize § 409 in the
way he does. Id. at 736-39.
51 Id.
52 Id. at 734-35.
5 Pierce County v. Guillen, 537 U.S. 129, 146-47 (2003).
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prohibition of, some use of interstate facilities. The result is an interpretation
of the Commerce Clause that robs it of any discernible purpose.
The second short-coming can be laid at Professor Baker's door. She faults
Justice Thomas for permitting Congress to choose an immediate regulatory
target that is not itself a channel or instrumentality of commerce. 54 On first
blush, this sounds extreme. Not even the Old Court restricted Congress to the
regulation of activities conceived to be commerce in themselves, but rather
insisted that Congress must limit regulatory statutes to activities having a
"direct" connection to other activities that count as commerce. 55 Probably
Professor Baker means only that the Court should take responsibility for
deciding whether an immediate activity is linked, in turn, to channels or
instrumentalities. She objects, then, to Thomas' explicit respect for Congress'
judgment regarding the empirical connection between § 409 and the purpose of
56
the Act of which that section is a part.
Justice Thomas' willingness to let Congress determine empirical matters
seems unremarkable. Recall, though, that in Lopez and United States v.
Morrison the Court suggested that it would no longer live with "reasonable"
congressional judgments about the effects of regulation on commerce. 57 By
some accounts, the Court means to exercise independent judgment about
whether a sufficient link to interstate markets exists and set aside congressional
determinations it thinks are wrong (though perhaps not unreasonably wrong).
For my own part, I am encouraged that Justice Thomas did not take that
approach in Guillen. Reports of the death of deference to congressional
empirical judgments may have been exaggerated. If, however, Professor Baker
would have the Court make first-order judgments here that mirror the firstorder judgments the Court seemed to make in Lopez and Morrison, she is on
less uncertain ground. Her position may not be popular in academic circles,
but that's hardly the test.
Professor Baker concedes that Congress can reach activities that do not
count as channels or instrumentalities "when the aim is to protect" activities
that do fall under those headings. 58 She contends, however, that the Court's
precedents are "not indifferent" to what target activities "are. '59 She insists
that some justices have "strongly suggested" that there are "special
constraints" on legislation that "intrudes upon integral areas of historical state
sovereignty. '' 60 For this, she cites National League of Cities v. Usery,6' Lopez

14 Baker, Lochner's

Legacy, supra note 1, at 735-36.
5 See, e.g., Carterv. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 302-03 (1936).
56 Guillen, 537 U.S. at 147 (holding that "Congress could reasonably believe" that § 409

would lead to greater highway safety).
17 See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 615 (2000); United States v. Lopez, 514
U.S. 549, 557 n.2 (1995).
11 Baker, Lochner's Legacy, supra note 1, at 737.
59 Id.
60 Id.
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and Morrison, and Justice Kennedy's concurring opinion in Lopez. In this
vein, Baker faults Justice Thomas for saying that he needn't worry about the
argument that § 409 "violates the principles of dual sovereignty embodied in
the Tenth Amendment" because the Washington Supreme Court didn't address
62
that claim.
There is something in what Baker says. Everyone recognizes that National
League of Cities has a certain life after death. Both Lopez and Morrison
contain explicit warnings about congressional meddling with affairs regarding
which "States historically have been sovereign. '63 Justice Kennedy's separate
(but controlling) opinion in Lopez may be the most important of the lot. In that
instance, Kennedy distanced himself from much of Chief Justice Rehnquist's
opinion for the Court and explained his own position on the ground that the
statute touched a matter of "traditional state concern. ''64 Still, it's been a long
time since the Supreme Court invalidated an enactment of the Congress solely
on the theory that it displaced state policy in a field in which the states had
traditionally been dominant. The Court came close in the Sugar Trust Case,
when it held that Congress could not regulate intrastate manufacturing because
a state legislature could. 65 Even there, the Court purported only to be
interpreting the term "commerce," not to be exercising judicial power in the
name of "traditional" state concerns standing alone. 66 It wouldn't be fair,
either, to say that National League of Cities simply enforced some
constitutional protection for "integral areas of historical state sovereignty."
The doctrine in that case was more nuanced. Or so the Court explained in
subsequent decisions.67 Finally, neither Lopez nor Morrison can be cited for
the proposition that state sovereignty alone defeats a federal statute regulating
either the channels and instrumentalities of commerce or activities that
Re-reading Kennedy's concurring
substantially affect national markets.
68
opinion in Lopez, I'm inclined to think he was moved primarily by Marbury.
He went along so as not to shirk the Court's responsibility for holding
69
Congress in check at least on occasion.
If Professor Baker reads Justice Thomas' reference to "dual sovereignty"
correctly, she is quite right. The Court is forever intimating that a federal
statute otherwise valid under the Commerce Clause can be struck down

61 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
62 Baker, Lochner's Legacy, supra note 1, at 738 (quoting Guillen, 537 U.S. at 148 n. 10).
63 Lopez, 514 U.S. at 564, cited in Morrison, 529 U.S. at 613.

64 Id. at 580 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
65 United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1, 11 (1895).
66 Id. at 11-15.
67

E.g., Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining & Recl. Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 286-91 (1981).

68 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).

69 See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 583 (Kennedy, J., concurring); see also City of Boeme v.
Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 511 (1997) (Kennedy, J., opinion of the Court).
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because it independently "violates" the Tenth Amendment. 70 We have to live
with that loose and confusing talk, though some of us wonder whether the
Court isn't deliberately sloppy in order to create the impression that it has text
on which to rest when it really doesn't. Nevertheless, when the Court is
careful (as it was in New York 7 ' and Printz72) there is no denying the truth: the
Tenth Amendment has no content of its own, and Darby is alive and well. 73 So
if Justice Thomas meant in Guillen that he could, at once, hold that § 409
offends no internal restraint on the commerce power and disclaim any
argument that § 409 falls outside a delegated power, then, yes, he was "less
74
than wholly candid."
It's more likely, though, that Thomas was trying to say something else. The
Solicitor General argued in Guillen that the Washington Supreme Court had
not addressed the different question whether § 409 runs afoul of an external
restraint on congressional power - like the state sovereign immunity the Court
has inferred from the Constitution's structure. 75 Recall that in Printz and other
70 E.g., Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 935-36 (1997) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
71New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
72Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997).
73United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 124 (1941) (explaining that the Tenth
Amendment "states but a truism that all is retained which has not been surrendered");
accordPrintz, 521 U.S. at 919 (explaining that the Tenth Amendment only makes "express"
what would otherwise be implicit in the enumeration of congressional powers); New York,
505 U.S. at 156 (reaffirming the Darby understanding).
7 Baker, Lochner's Legacy, supra note 1, at 738.
75Brief for the United States at 25, Pierce County v. Guillen, 537 U.S. 129 (2003) (No.
0 1-1229), available at 2002 WL 1560236. By tying the state court's judgment exclusively
to internal restraints, the Solicitor General was able to argue that the Court could also avoid
the question whether the private respondents in Guillen had standing to advance a claim that
§ 409 violates an external restraint touching state sovereignty (e.g., the anti-commandeering
principle). Id. at 22-23. Standing doctrine being what it is, I wouldn't hazard a guess about
the answer. Cf Dennis v. Higgins, 498 U.S. 439, 451 (1991) (holding that private
businesses have a "right" under the Commerce Clause for purposes of using the Ku Klux
Klan Act to challenge state regulation). The posture is odd. The private parties in Guillen
would be arguing that they are entitled under state law to discover information in the hands
of defendant officers of local government. To that end, they would be contending that the
federal statute on which the defendants rest their refusal to make the information available is
unconstitutional because it intrudes on state sovereignty. The issue is not whether the
private litigants would have standing for purposes of Article III. It may be whether they
would have some variant on third-party standing to assert a constitutional claim belonging
to their adversaries (as representatives of the state). Then again, it might be argued that
claims partaking of state sovereignty (or even federalism generally) ultimately belong to
individuals whose liberty is safeguarded by the diffusion of governmental power entailed.
Justice Thomas dropped a hint that the Court might think it best not to allow self-interested
private litigants to press structural claims of this nature when, by hypothesis, the "State's
legislative and executive branches expressly approve and accept the benefits and terms of
the federal statute in question." Guillen, 537 U.S. at 148 n.10.
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cases, the Court cited the Tenth Amendment not as itself an external limitation
on federal authority, but rather as confirmation that external restraints exist
even in the absence of some alternative textual home. 76 When Justice Thomas
explained that he needn't address any argument that § 409 violates the
"principles of dual sovereignty embodied in the Tenth Amendment," 77 he
attempted to commandeer
probably only meant the claim that Congress had 78
state officials to administer the Highway Safety Act.
Professor Baker thinks § 152,79 the provision of the Act to which § 409 is an
amendment, would violate the anti-commandeering principle. 80 That provision
requires states to "conduct and systematically maintain" surveys of public
roads in order to identify hazards. 81 It is those reports, in turn, that § 409
shields from discovery in lawsuits claiming that dangerous conditions caused
accidents. In Baker's view, § 152 directs state officials to implement federal
policy in the manner of the Brady Law in Printz and thus can be sustained, if at
all, only on the basis of the spending power. 82 Accordingly, by her account,
Justice Thomas could not blithely set any spending analysis aside simply
because he held that § 409 offends no internal restraint on the Commerce
Power. This is a fair point. Yet the explanation for Thomas' position is the
same: He almost certainly meant to accept the Solicitor General's
representation that the judgment below was grounded exclusively on the
83
internal restraint ground.

76 See Mathew D. Adler, State Sovereignty and the Anti-CommandeeringCases, ANNALS
AM. ACAD. POL. &SoC.Sc., March 2001, at 158, 161.
7 Guillen, 537 U.S. at 148 n.10.
78 Justice Thomas was also being sloppy when he said that he needn't decide whether §
409 "could also be a proper exercise of Congress' authority under the Spending Clause or
the Necessary and Proper Clause." Id. at 148 n.9 (emphasis added). The disjunctive "or" in
that sentence suggests that the Necessary and Proper Clause might have supplied an
alternative basis for congressional action, apart from the commerce and spending powers.
But that has never been the law.
7 23 U.S.C. § 152 (2000).
o Baker, Lochner's Legacy, supra note 1, at 733-36.
8l 23 U.S.C. § 152 (a)(1).
82 Baker, Lochner's Legacy, supra note 1, at 736-39.
83 If the Court were to decide whether § 152 offends the anti-commandeering rule, I
don't like Baker's chances. Recall that Justice O'Connor wrote separately in Printz to say
that the Court had not suggested that "ministerial reporting requirements" were
unconstitutional. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 936 (1997) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring). True, § 152 addresses the states alone (not in company with private industry).
Still, the Court might conclude that the regulation it imposes is covered by Garcia v. San
Antonio Metro. Trans. Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985). Cf Reno v. Condon, 528 U.S. 141, 151
(2000) (upholding a federal statute prohibiting the states from disclosing information about
motorists with driving permits).
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III.

THE SPENDING POWER ANALYSIS

Professor Baker also objects that Justice Thomas declined to use Guillen as
a vehicle for curbing Congress' power to regulate pursuant to the spending
power. 84 Alternatively, she argues that § 409 fails the tests established by
South Dakota v.Dole85 and Davis v.Monroe County Board of Education86 or,
if it doesn't, those tests should be cinched up. 87 In this, Baker rehearses her
warning that Congress' power to achieve regulatory goals by purchasing state
cooperation threatens to surrender the beachhead the Court has established in
the Commerce Clause cases. 8 In prior work, Baker has argued that Congress
should be allowed to offer the states only enough money to reimburse them for
expenditures they make toward implementing federal programs. 89 Here, she
lays that approach aside in favor of other arguments. Those arguments, in turn,
would have the Court engage in the kind of behavior associated with Lochner.
First, a disclaimer: Professor Baker does not propose that § 409 is (or should
be) invalid because it fails to "provide" for the "general Welfare of the United
States." 90 That way certainly lies Lochner.91 It is obvious enough that the
legislative branch must be entitled to decide what counts as the public interest
in general. The Court could second-guess Congress at that level of generality
only by sounding very much like Justice Peckham explaining why the Bake
Shop Act didn't further the public health. 92 Just as choosing among publicregarding purposes is for state legislatures in police power cases, selecting
among public-regarding ends must equally be left to Congress in spending
power cases.
Professor Baker does argue that § 409 is (or should be) invalid because it is
insufficiently related to the purpose for which the Highway Safety Act makes
federal funds available - namely, to reduce accidents. 93 Baker acknowledges
that the Supreme Court has scarcely demanded a tight fit between a particular
condition and the goals of Congress' larger program. All that is necessary is
that the condition "bear some relationship" to Congress' purpose. 94 Yet here
14 Baker,

Lochner's Legacy, supra note 1, at 739-5 1.
483 U.S. 203 (1987).
86 526 U.S. 629 (1999).
87 Baker, Lochner's Legacy, supra note 1, at 739-51.
88 See Baker, ConditionalFederalSpending, supra note 2, at 1916.
19 Id. at 1954-55. That understanding would certainly produce the results Baker wants,
85

though at the price of eliminating virtually any congressional capacity to regulate by means
of conditional spending. See David E. Engdahl, The Spending Power, 44 DUKE L.J. 1, 57
(1994).
1.
90 U.S. CONT. art I, § 8, cl.
1 Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).

Id.at 57.
91Baker, Lochner's Legacy, supra note 1, at 746-51.
94 Baker cites New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 167 (1992) (Baker's emphasis
added). Baker, Lochner's Legacy, supra note 1, at 747.
92
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again Baker insists that the Court should up the ante in order to keep the
spending power from becoming an easy alternative avenue to regulatory goals
Congress cannot otherwise achieve.
Baker contends that § 409 doesn't help to avoid highway accidents because
it isn't needed to prompt state officials to comply with § 152. She has located
"no evidence" that the Federal Government has ever docked a state for failing
to gather information about hazardous road conditions. 95 From that, she infers
that the states collect the data required without the additional incentive that §
409 might create. 96 Now then, this is precisely the kind of armchair analysis of
empirical circumstances for which Lochner is roundly criticized. Professor
Baker offers no serious exploration of the experience with § 152 prior to the
adoption of § 409, nor even a careful appraisal of any evidence there may be
that adding § 409 to the mix might help keep the states in line. Her position (at
this level) is simply an inference drawn from the mere fact that states were
willing to accept federal funds at a time when this particular assurance did not
exist. Small wonder the Supreme Court is not so quick to dismiss the
possibility that Congress has some reason for doing what it does. Consider, for
example, that a "belt-and-suspenders" policy might make sense, given that the
remedy of withholding funds is drastic and thus rarely invoked.
Professor Baker contends that the real parties in interest are officials of local
government, who typically have the duty to collect the information required by
§ 152 and, in turn, have an incentive to do so assiduously in hopes of slicing
themselves a larger share of the federal pie. 97 Baker insists, however, that
those local officers have an independent incentive to maintain highways: if
they don't, they open themselves to private lawsuits. To the extent § 409
allows them to withhold data from tort plaintiffs, that independent incentive is
undermined. If local authorities know their chances of avoiding tort liability
are reduced by virtue of the ability to withhold probative evidence, they will be
less willing to part with local treasure to keep roads in good repair. By Baker's
account, it is at least possible that § 409 diminishes locally-funded
expenditures on road projects more than it nourishes federally-funded
expenditures. If that is the way the incentives play out, the "net result" of §
409 will be a "decrease in highway safety" - a result that is "antithetical" to the
Highway Safety Act's purpose, far less "related" to that purpose within the
98
meaning of spending power doctrine.
Of course, Professor Baker does not know how these incentives will play
out. She offers no data to throw light on the empirical questions she raises.
Nor does she report on any evidence that Congress might have developed. She
thinks the Supreme Court should work through the economic calculus in order
to decide, as a constitutional matter, whether § 409 serves the Act's objectives.
95 Id. at 748.

Id.
Id. at 748-49.
91 Id. at 749-51.
96

97
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The question whether § 409 is constitutionally permissible becomes, by her
account, the empirical question whether § 409 is good policy. This, too, is
Lochner resurgent in another place. If there is one thing we (or most of us)
agree upon, it's that the Court is not equipped to make policy judgments of this
kind and, more to the point, that legislative bodies, state and federal, are.
Congress may have misjudged whether § 409 does more good than harm. But

in a democracy, we respond
to poor political judgments (regarding highway
99
safety) with better politics.

IV. THE PLACE OF TRADITION IN THE ANALYSIS
Professor Baker notes (fairly enough) that when the Court appraises the
validity of a federal statute, it invariably considers whether the subject matter
has traditionally been regulated by the states.100 She makes something of this,
more perhaps than have the justices themselves (at least consciously) to date.
I'm not sure what precisely she has in mind. She toys with the idea that the
Court should find a federal statute unconstitutional solely on the basis of the
empirical fact that the activity regulated has historically been left to the states.
Specifically, she says the idea that "the recent Commerce Clause
jurisprudence... is driven by a (sometimes) unstated inquiry into... whether
the congressional enactment seeks to regulate an area 'where States historically
have been sovereign' or whether it instead involves an appropriate and
traditional federal function." 10 1 The disjunctive "or" distinguishes between
matters that have historically been handled by the states, on the one hand, and
matters that "involve" an "appropriate" federal "function" on the other. It's
not clear whether the subjects Baker puts in those two boxes exhaust the
universe of affairs that government might regulate. If they do, and if matters
involving "appropriate" federal "functions" are the only subjects that Congress
can reach, then it appears that in Baker's view the constitutionality of federal
enactments turns entirely on whether, as a matter of experience, the subjects
regulated have historically been governed by the states.
99Professor Baker also contends that § 409 fails the "clear notice" test. Id. at 742-46.
Chief Justice Rehnquist explained in Dole that Congress must express conditions on
spending "unambiguously." South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 207 (1987). The idea is
to respect the states' entitlement to choose. Only if the elements of the deal being offered
are clear can the states decide intelligently whether to accept it. Yet Professor Baker would
demand greater clarity from Congress than the Court itself requires in cases like Dole and
Davis. By her account, § 409 lends itself to four different readings, thus demonstrating that
it is not sufficiently exacting. Baker, Lochner's Legacy, supra note 1, at 742. Those four
alternative constructions are not far-fetched. Lawyers might well spin them out in service of
arguments about § 409's effect in particular circumstances. Still, it's hard to think that any
state's decision whether to accept federal funds would be affected if § 409 were drafted
differently. That, after all, is the point of the "clear statement" doctrine - not to preempt all
fair disagreement about the meaning of a statute in context.
100 Baker, Lochner's Legacy, supra note 1, at 757.
101 Id. at 762 (quoting United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 564 (1995)).
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This is an astonishing idea. Baker herself mulls the possibility that the
02
Court may yet (and perhaps should) resuscitate National League of Cities.'
But she is actually suggesting something more dramatic than limits on federal
regulation of the states qua states. 10 3 Here; she does seem to propose reviving
the Sugar Trust Case, which relied on formal labels to divvy up regulatory
targets between Congress and the states. 1°4 Baker, too, might use formal
categories of some kind. But if I understand her correctly, she would chiefly
let tradition draw the line between constitutionally permissible and
impermissible congressional action. That would make experience (subject to
empirical proof) the determinant of constitutional validity. The Court would
be charged to keep Congress from deciding to regulate affairs that, for some
reason or other, Congress has not regulated in the past. I'm not one to worry
overmuch about identifying any particular warrant for judicial law-making.
But even I have to wonder what possible justification could be offered for
holding that the country is constitutionally obliged to do something the way it
always has.
Nothing the Court has said in any of its recent cases supports this thesis.
Most often, the Court takes account of the empirical fact of past state
regulation as an aid to statutory construction. The Court does not hold that a
federal enactment is invalid simply because it reaches a target not previously
managed at the federal level. At most, the Court expresses doubts about the
constitutionality of such a course and, relatedly, Congress' intention to operate
close to the perimeter of its authority. 05 To ensure that constitutional issues
are not raised unnecessarily, the Court construes statutes not to reach so far in
the absence of exacting statutory language. Whatever one may think of the
"doctrine of constitutional doubt" and the recent flurry of "clear statement"
rules, the fact remains that the Court has not declared a federal statute
unconstitutional simply because it departs from past regulatory practice. So far
anyway, the Constitution has not become an undifferentiated drag on progress.
Professor Baker probably means to argue that the Court considers regulatory
experience at the threshold of its analysis and beefs up the rigor of its review
when Congress has moved into new territory. Specifically, she says that
attention to a tradition of state regulation is "pivotal."' 0 6 She may mean, then,
that the Court begins (and perhaps should begin) its analysis by identifying and
characterizing what Congress presumes to regulate. The Court's conclusions
regarding those questions, in turn, determine (and perhaps should determine)
102 See National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976); Baker, Lochner's

Legacy, supra note 1, at 763-64.
103 Others propose that (more modest) course. E.g., CHARLES FRIED, SAYING WHAT THE
LAW Is: THE CONSTITUTION INTHE SUPREME COURT 37-38 (2004).
104
1o5

United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1, 13-14 (1895).
E.g., Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook County v. United States Army Corps of

Engineers, 531 U.S. 159, 172 (2001).
106 Baker, Lochner's Legacy, supra note 1, at 763.
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the direction in which the rest of the analysis proceeds. If Congress has
regulated the same subject matter in the past, the Court applies a generous
version of the doctrinal formulations for judging the validity of statutes. If
Congress has previously left the subject matter to the states, the Court brings to
bear a more muscular version of those formulations.
This position can be defended. But only at the price of grappling more
generally with the difficulties of resting constitutional meaning on appeals to
tradition. This is scarcely the only place where experience is said to influence
decisions on the constitutionality of governmental action. We are more
familiar with references to history in Fourteenth Amendment cases, where the
operative question is whether some liberty has enjoyed a tradition of respect
that entitles it to special constitutional solicitude)107 Recall the vexing
problems in that context: defining the liberty interest at stake at the right level
of generality, discovering evidence regarding the way it was treated in the past,
and assessing whether that tradition may have evolved over time. 10 8 Those
same problems reappear here and demand attention.
If Professor Baker takes up this task, she will necessarily retrace the Court's
efforts since Lochner to carve out a role for itself in orchestrating a political
system that is developing underfoot. The core challenge is to foster policymaking by politically accountable institutions, but simultaneously to check
those very institutions when they threaten values that should prevail even in
the face of majoritarian sentiment. 10 9 None of the federal measures Baker
finds troubling falls in the latter category. Here again, Congress certainly may
make bad policy in the exercise of its powers to regulate commerce and to
spend federal funds. But the Court has no warrant to strike policies down
because the justices conclude they are unwise.
There is another explanation for the Court's recent decisions in this field,
including Guillen. The Court appreciates that Congress may achieve its ends
by offering the states financial inducements to cooperate. 110 Yet the Court
does not find that prospect troubling, because the states' "dignity" is preserved
inasmuch as they are free to choose whether to accept conditions in exchange
for cash."' There is even a way in which a sweeping congressional power to
place conditions on spending celebrates the states' autonomy more than would
107 See, e.g., Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 124 (1989).
108 See J.M. Balkin, Tradition,Betrayal,and the Politics of Deconstruction, 11 CARDOZO
L. REv. 1613, 1615 (1990); Ernest Young, Rediscovering Conservatism: Burkean Political
Theory and ConstitutionalInterpretation,72 N.C. L. REV. 619, 698 (1994).

109Baker has begun this work. See Lynn A. Baker & Ernest A. Young, Federalism and
the Double StandardofJudicialReview, 51 DuKE L.J. 75, 80-84 (2001).

11o E.g., Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 755 (1999); Coll. Savings Bank v. Fla. Prepaid
Postsecondary Educ. Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 678 n.2 (1999).
111 See Evan H. Caminker, JudicialSolicitudefor State Dignity, ANNALS AM. AcAD. POL.
& Soc. Sci., March 2001, at 81, 82; cf Fed. Mar. Comm'n v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 535

U.S. 743, 760 (2002) (explaining that the "preeminent purpose" of state sovereign immunity
is to spare the states the "indignity" of being sued by private litigants).
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the diminished authority that Professor Baker would allow. Congress'
expansive power under current law allows states the contractual freedom to
bind themselves to behave in ways that Congress could not flatly require - the
better to acknowledge the states' station as autonomous entities entitled to
strike the bargains they will.
CONCLUSION

The Rehnquist Court has established important limits on congressional
power and, into the bargain, raised questions about Congress' capacity to
establish and implement a wide variety of social welfare, civil rights, and
environmental programs. The very presence of the Guillen case on the Court's
docket in 2004 is evidence enough that things constitutional are not what they
used to be. Still, it seems unlikely that the Court has adopted the agenda that
Professor Baker has in mind - with all the Lochnerian baggage her analysis
entails.1 12 At least, I should say, I hope not.

112 See, e.g., Christopher H. Schroeder, Environmental Law, Congress, and the Court's
New Federalism Doctrine, 78 IND. L.J. 413, 452 (2003); Mark V. Tushnet, Alarmism Versus
Moderation in Responding to the Rehnquist Court, 78 IND. L.J. 47, 55-56 (2003).

